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ABSTRACT  
The huge presence of foreign banks in CEECs leads to a strong dependence to banking 
foreign claims. They may be cross-border claims or claims of foreign subsidiaries located in 
the host country. Are foreign banks a factor that attracts foreign claims in the host country? 
Does their presence stabilize banking foreign flows and in fine the domestic credit supply? 
Using a Push&Pull framework, we adopt a macroeconomic point of view by using balance of 
payments data concerning banking foreign financing on all sectors in CEECs. Tests with 
panel data show that the presence of foreign banks is a substitute for banking foreign loans 
and is not a factor of their stability. Nevertheless, it has a stabilizing role on the domestic 
credit. 
 
Classification JEL: F23, F32, F36, G01, G21 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past decade, the banking system in Central and East European Countries 
(CEECs) has been dominated by foreign banks. Since the end of the 1990s, 
governments have set up privatisation programmes in a context marked by the 
presence of very few domestic banks, where few local investors could afford to buy, 
leaving the door wide open to foreign investors. Today, on average, foreign banks 
own three-quarters of CEEC bank assets (as opposed to 19% for the Euro zone and 
23.8% for the European Union). This share (Table 1, Appendices) even exceeds 80% 
in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania and is over 90% in the Czech Republic, Estonia 
and Slovakia. Slovenia is the exception, where the share was just 28.5% in 2007, as 
the authorities have given preference to the creation of two powerful public-owned 
banks. In CEECs, this marked presence of foreign banks stands alongside a significant 
dependence on external financing. In 2009, the total amount of foreign banking loans 
(or foreign claims to use BIS terminology) represented at least 70% of CEEC GDP, 
thereby engendering the risk of a sudden withdrawal of capital (Table 2, Appendices). 
This involves either external and cross-border financing (cross-border claims) from 
the parent bank to the borrowing country, or loans made by local subsidiaries (local 
claims) via, possibly, financial support from the parent bank.  
Further to the demise of Lehman Brothers, emerging countries suffered from significant 
outflows of funds between Autumn 2008 and Spring 2009. All geographic areas were affected 
by these “sudden stop” phenomena, but the focus was very much on emerging countries in 
Europe (Berthaud & Colliac [2010]). On average, the flows of foreign bank financing fell by 
13% over the area between June 2008 and December 2009 (BIS data), with very sharp falls in 
the Baltic States (around -30%), also in Slovakia and, to a lesser extent in the Czech Republic 
(-15%) and Slovenia (-13%). The crisis that shook major international banks between 2007 
and 2009 has raised the question of the potential destabilising role of parent banks for the host 
country in a situation of financial stress. Is the presence of foreign banks in CEECs an 
attractive factor for outside financing? Is it a factor of stability or instability for this financing? 
What are the consequences on the stability of the domestic credit? In the first section, we have 
expounded empirical considerations as to the decisive factors behind foreign bankrolling and 
their stabilising or destabilising effect on the host country; we have then analysed more 
precisely and from an econometric viewpoint the stability of foreign bank financing in CEECs 
and the decisive factors therein, and that of domestic credit. To this end and contrary to 
 traditional literature concerning the role of foreign banks in emerging countries, we have 
adopted a macroeconomic viewpoint using balance of payments data on loans from foreign 
banks. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The study of the impact of the presence of foreign banks on the amount and the 
stability of foreign bank financing and domestic credit lies at a crossroads between 
two trends in current literature.  
 
Foreign banks and the stability of financing 
Empirical literature as to the role of foreign banks in emerging countries and more 
particularly in CEECs has, as a general rule, adopted a microeconomic stance to 
underline the differences in behaviour between banks with foreign ownership and 
local banks. Studies have shown primarily that foreign located banks are more 
efficient than national banks, and that compared with national banks their business is 
less influenced by the economic conditions of the host country (Haselman [2006]). 
Moreover, by adopting long-term strategies in their foreign operations, via the 
subsidiaries, they stabilise bank credit for economies in times of crisis (Haselman 
[2006]; de Haas & Van Lelyveld [2006], [2010]; Arena & al. [2007]). Haselman 
(2006) compares the determinants of credit supply of foreign banks and domestic 
banks in 12 transition economies. He shows that the activity of foreign banks is 
influenced by economic conditions in the host country, but more weakly than in the 
case of domestic banks. He concludes that, because they rely less on domestic 
conditions than local banks, foreign banks would maintain their supply of credit in 
times of crisis (when the local banks would reduce it), and help to stabilize the 
domestic credit market. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006, 2010) lead to the same 
conclusion by introducing a dummy of a banking crisis in credit supply equation. 
While this variable is not significant in the regressions for foreign banks, it is 
significant and negative for local banks. They conclude that during periods of crisis, 
domestic banks contracted their credit supply, which was not the case of foreign 
banks, who thus had a stabilizing effect.This stabilising effect might be explained by 
the existence of an internal capital market with banking groups, which enables parent 
banks to maintain their subsidiaries’ credit supply (de Haas & Van Lelyveld [2006], 
 [2010]; Dinger [2009]). The parent banks operate as a last-resort lender in the event of 
recession in the host country or of internal problems with the subsidiary.  
Nevertheless, the empirical literature is not completely convincing. If Haselman 
[2006] finds that the foreign banks react less to the economic situation of the host 
country than the domestic banks, de Haas and Van Lelyveld [2006, 2010] found the 
opposite result. The index of crisis used by them in their demonstration is also 
problematic. Indeed, this index takes the value 1 (existence of a systemic banking 
crisis) at periods when the share of the foreign banks was relatively weak (12% on 
average on the whole of their sample). Apart from privatization transactions, it is often 
following the crisis of the domestic banking systems, in the 90s, that the share of 
foreign banks has increased during period of restructuring. It is thus logical that the 
index of crisis is significant for domestic banks but not for foreign banks1. In addition, 
we can also suppose that foreign banks resist the crisis better, not because they use the 
financial support of their parent bank, but simply because they are better managed or 
less fragile (less non performing loans in asset portfolios). This assumption is 
confirmed by the result of Haas and Van Lelyveld [2006, 2010] according to which 
only the greenfield foreign banks (completely created, compared to the take-over ones, 
acquired) follow their strategies of credit supply even if a shock affects the host 
country: contrary to the take-over banks, they did not inherit non performing loans.  
Then, the studies conclude the stabilizing role of the foreign banks in the CEECs 
because it is implicitly supposed that emerging countries or countries in transition, and 
their banking systems, are more unstable and fragile than the parent banks and the 
home countries. However, in all the estimations of the above-mentioned studies, the 
supply of domestic credit in the CEECs depends significantly on the financial health 
of the parent banks (indicator of profitability, or ratio of provisions): so, foreign banks 
may have a destabilizing role on the domestic credit and the host country.  
So, the stabilising character of the presence of foreign banks on domestic credit supply 
via the parent/subsidiary link remains open to question. There are risks inherent with 
the parent bank/ subsidiary relationship (McGuire & Tarachev [2008]), for instance a 
parent bank in trouble may restrict its financial support to subsidiaries. It may also 
                                                 
1
 Moreover, the non significativity of a crisis dummy variable in the equation of foreign banks 
supply of credit, does not suggest that foreign banks have not contracted their credit supply 
during crisis and therefore have a stabilizing role. 
 arbitrate between subsidiaries and modulate its financial support according to the state 
of the host country and to expected yields (substitution effect), and not merely 
produce a support effect for the most fragile of its subsidiaries (de Haas & Van 
Lelyveld [2006] and [2010]). So belonging to a large network of subsidiaries may 
have a destabilising effect for a subsidiary and for the host economy.  
Finally, there is no empirical evidence in these studies of the existence of financial 
support from the parent to the subsidiary, which might explain the stability of the 
global supply of bank credit to the economy in times of crisis, as this data is not 
available. It is simply supposed. To our knowledge, this support has not been 
measured through foreign bank loans received by a given country. To see if the 
presence of foreign banks in a country leads to greater stability of this financing and 
the domestic credit supply, we need first and foremost to ascertain whether or not it is 
a factor of capital inflows. This latter query leads us to consider another field of 
literature. 
 
Determinants of capital inflows: the push/pull factors 
Since the pioneering articles from Calvo & al. [1993] and Fernandez-Arias [1996], the 
decisive factors for inflows of capital2 to emerging economies have been listed under 
two categories. The push factors are factors outside the emerging country, i.e. rather 
unfavourable conditions for investment in industrialised countries, which push flows 
in an emerging country, whereas pull factors, are inside and specific to the emerging 
country, i.e. positive fundamentals which pull capital into a country3. Following on 
from Calvo & al. [1993], who studied the role of traditional push factors (interest rates 
and economic growth in developed countries) during the debt crisis of 1982, empirical 
studies have evaluated the respective role of each category of factor and delivered 
different results according to the emerging region. In particular, Jeanneau & Micu 
[2002], in a Push&Pull framework, have shown the significant role of pull factors in 
                                                 
2
 In general in these studies, the data used is portfolio inflows (Fernandez-Arias, [1996] ; Chuhan & 
al., [1998]). 
3
 See Brana, Lahet [2010a] for a survey. 
 Asia, and of push factors in Latin America4 over the period between 1985 and 2000 as 
determinants for international bank claims5. 
After the Asian crisis of 1997, literature focused on the study of contagion: 
transmission channels for shocks and swings in sentiment from foreign investors 
(Forbes & Rigobon [2002]; Masson [1999]). Thus, alongside the traditional 
Push&Pull variables, variables related to aversion to risk (such as the high yield 
spread or the US swap spread) appeared significant to explain the capital flows to 
emerging countries (Jeanneau & Micu [2002]).  
In the end, few articles have tested banking variables as determinants for movements 
in capital flows, particularly foreign bank loans. McGuire & Tarashev [2008], over the 
period between 1990 and 2007 and relating to determinants for international bank 
claims, introduced the criterion of quality of banks from lending countries6 alongside 
traditional macroeconomic factors, plus an indicator for the openness of host countries 
towards foreign banks without using any particular analysis frame or any variables for 
the soundness of host country banks. Hermann & Mihaljek [2010], focusing on cross-
border claims7 between 1993 and 2008 in the frame of a gravity model, have shown 
that in addition to distance, to traditional variables relating to global and specific 
factors and to risk aversion indicators, the soundness of banks in the lending country is 
a factor that explains the granting of loans to an emerging country, whereas the 
soundness of local banks is a pull factor8. According to the authors, the attractive 
nature of the soundness of local banks in CEECs apparently stems from the 
implantation of foreign banks, even though no specific variable was used to measure 
this idea9.  
                                                 
4
 The authors show the positive impact of the growth posted by the lending country, or the country’s 
excessive liquidity, thereby marking a difference with traditional literature, particularly Calvo & al. 
[1993]. 
5
 Based on the BIS data base, Consolidated Banking Statistics. Loans between parent bank and 
subsidiaries are compensated. 
6
 Evaluated by the banking sector’s stock market index, the expected frequency of default in the 
banking system and the volatility of assets. For the latter two variables, indicators from Moddy’s. 
7
 Based on the BIS data base, Locational Banking Statistics. Loans between parent banks and 
subsidiaries are included but the authors say nothing about them. It corresponds in fact to received 
cross-border claims included in the “Other investment” category of the balance of payments. 
8
 The soundness of banks is measured by the gap between the banking sector’s stock market index and the 
reference stock market index, which furthermore is open to criticism from the authors. A rising index implicitly 
reflects inflows of foreign capital.  
9
 Simply a correlation of 0.7 between the soundness indicator used for the banking system and the share of local 
banks with foreign ownership.  
 Consequently, to study the role of foreign banks in the host country plus the attraction 
and stabilisation of foreign bank financing, it would be wise, in a Push&Pull 
framework, to include the soundness of lending country banks and that of host country 
banks, together with a variable that accurately measures the presence of foreign banks 
in the local banking system as a pull factor, something that has not really been 
achieved to date in published literature. We have adopted a macroeconomic stance and 
used balance of payments data to address the evolution of foreign bank financing 
granted to CEECs and the determinants thereof. Thus, like Haas et al. [2006] and 
Haselman [2006], for whom the stable behaviour of foreign banks emerges through 
the refusal to tighten their credit supply (in times of crisis in the host country), we will 
study the variation in foreign bank loans and their standard deviation using the method 
developed by Garcia Herrero & al. [2007]10, to appraise the volatility / stability of 
foreign bank financing received by CEECs. 
 
 
FINANCIAL FLOWS AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY: THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN 
SUBSIDIARIES  
 
In CEECs as at December 2009, financing from foreign banks (or foreign claims to 
use BIS terminology), was taking the form of cross-border claims (60%) and local 
claims (40%) granted by foreign banks located in the host country. However, only 
40% of these foreign claims are in local currency (local in local), as opposed to 60% 
in foreign currency (international claims).  
A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) casts light on the link between the amount 
and the type of foreign claim (local or cross-border, in foreign or local currency), their 
volatility and the presence of foreign banks set up in CEECs (Graph 1). First of all, the 
presence of foreign banks (foreign bank variable) is correlated to the granting of local 
claims by the subsidiaries (to the detriment of cross-border claims). It is also 
correlated to the granting of claims in local currency, a factor translating to a high 
proportion of domestic credit itself granted in local currency (left of the graph). 
Inversely, countries with more cross-border claims (without the presence of foreign 
banks) have more foreign claims denominated in foreign currency (International 
claims), a fact which ultimately helps to explain the “dollarization” of claims held by 
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 Calculation of the average standard deviation to analyse the stability of claims granted by Italian, 
Spanish and American banks in a hundred countries. 
 resident non-financial agents (right of the graph). Additionally, these countries have a 
high credit ratio on deposits, translating to a funding gap that can become a serious 
issue in the event of sudden withdrawals of capital flows.  
The presence of foreign banks in CEECs is associated with the financial development 
of these countries (measured by the share of banking system assets in GDP) and with a 
certain degree of banking efficiency. Indeed, this “efficiency”, measured by the ratio 
‘number of employees/banking asset’ is inversely correlated to the share of foreign 
banks and the importance of multinational (parent) banks (vertical axis).  
However, the presence of foreign banks does not seem to be a pull factor. It would 
even appear that local banking market development via the located subsidiaries might 
be a substitute for foreign bank financing and precisely cross-border claims. Neither 
the share of external financing over GDP (FX variable) nor the share of foreign bank 
loans over GDP (Foreign claims variable or FC) is correlated to the percentage of 
foreign banks located in the country. 
 
 Graph 1. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (average 2000-2008) 
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with:  - Foreign Claims (FC) : foreign bank claims ( % GDP). 
- FX: total external financing (Direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investment, balance of 
payments statistics), % GDP. 
- Cross Border, Local claims, Local in Local, International claims: % total foreign claims. 
- Domestic credit in local currency, Domestic credit in foreign currency: % of total domestic credit.  
- Foreign banks: Share of foreign banks (% of assets in the banking system). 
- Concentration of (external) creditors, concentration of banking system (in the host country): 
Herfindahl index. 
- % Multinational banks: asset of the 20 biggest host country banks that are owned by the 20 largest 
multinational parent banks (European banks). 
- FC volatility: average standard deviation of foreign bank loans (Balance-of-Payment data) 
- FX volatility: average standard deviation of total external financing. 
- Loan volatility: average standard deviation of domestic credit.  
- Financial development: financial development indicator measured by total asset of the banking system 
/GDP, %. 
- Efficiency: number of employees in the banking system/banking asset.  
- Funding gap: domestic credit/banking deposit.  
Authors calculation with data from ECB, Bankscope, BIS and Datastream.  
 
According to the hypothesis put forward by de Haas & Lelyveld [2010] and Dinger 
[2009], CEECs appear to have an internal banking group capital market that involves 
flows between parent banks and subsidiaries. We should therefore note a positive link 
between the presence of foreign banks (or the percentage of parent banks operating in 
CEECs) and foreign bank flows. Yet the PCA does not seem to indicate the existence 
of such a link.  
Lastly, we note that the presence of foreign banks is no guarantee as to greater 
stability for external financing. There seems to be a link between the instability of 
 capital inflows (measured by the average standard deviation) as sole foreign banking 
loans (FC volatility variable) and the percentage of banking assets in the hands of 
foreign players. However, this instability of external financing does not lead to 
volatility with regards domestic credit (Loan Volatility variable), with the two 
variables being at opposite ends of the PCA horizontal axis. This might corroborate 
the hypothesis of a stabilising role from inter-bank claims and parent bank/ 
subsidiaries relations. 
 
Our econometric analysis is carried out in two steps. In the first step, tests make it 
possible to specify the determinants of foreign banks financing and the stability of it. 
A second step allows us to conclude on the role of foreign banks on the stability of the 
credit supply of the CEECs’ banking system.  
As a starting point, the supply of foreign bank loans is traditionally associated with 
push and with pull factors (Haselmann [2006]. The estimated equation for the 
determinants governing foreign bank loans takes the following form:  
 
K = c + X α + Y β + u                                                                                             (1) 
 
where K represents the net flows of foreign bank loans (balance of payments data), X is a 
vector of pull (or domestic) factors and Y a vector of push (or external) factors.  
 We chose to use balance of payments statistics instead of BIS banking statistics on 
loans from foreign banks for several reasons. K corresponds to the “other investment-banks” 
category of the financial account of the balance of payments, on a net flow basis, and covers 
all creditors’ countries. Conversely, BIS statistics measure the gross international claims of 
only BIS reporting banks (27 major banking centers) vis-à-vis individual countries. Moreover, 
these data include the exposures of their affiliates and are collected on a consolidated basis, so 
inter-office positions are netted out. When it comes down to it, balance of payments statistics 
allow for better matching the foreign banks behaviour on longer time series.  
Pull factors are represented by the fundamentals of the host country. They are 
approximated by the sovereign rating that we build using the numerical values of the 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s11 indices and working out the average. The advantage 
of this variable is that it is a good synthetic indicator of a country’s fundamentals and 
that it is closely monitored by international investors in their investment strategies 
(Rating variable). We have also taken on board the GDP growth rate in each country 
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 Long-term ratings in foreign currency.  
 (host country growth). We have also sought to ascertain whether more institutional 
variables have had an impact on inflows of bank loans. To do so, we have used the 
transition indicators of the EBRD, which gauge the progress of transition towards a 
market economy12 . We have calculated a mean indicator for the whole economy 
(Variable Score), and have used the indicator pertaining more specifically to the 
banking sector (Bank Score). Lastly, we have introduced a dummy variable, using the 
value 1 as from a country’s date of joining the European Union, and 0 before that date 
(EU Integration).  
Inflows of capital may also be explained by push factors. These include the economic 
and financial situation of the home countries. As over 90% of the foreign bank capital 
invested in East European countries comes from Europe, we have introduced a 
variable representing Euro zone growth (Euro zone growth). We have also introduced 
a variable representing the yield differential between the two zones (East European 
countries i and the Euro zone), based on the 3-month rates of Treasury bonds (Spread 
variable). Push factors also include variables relating to financial stress and appetite 
for risk. These variables, determined on international markets, may explain pure 
contagion effects and explain inflows and outflows of capital. We have therefore 
introduced (Dailami & al. [2008]; Coudert & al. [2008]), general monetary conditions 
(M3 growth rate in the Euro zone, the M3 excess liquidity/GDP ratio for all OECD 
countries), default risk indicators (Ted Spread, High Yield Spread, for the United 
States and Europe) and volatility risk indicators (VIX).  
In order to test the impact of the presence of foreign banks operating locally, we have 
added a foreign banks variable to pull factors, to measure the share of the host 
country’s banking assets that are held by foreign banks. We have also introduced the 
state of health of banks in the lending country (push factor) and that of banks in the 
borrowing country (pull factor). To this end, we have used Bankscope data for the 
banking systems in the 9 home countries from where the major banking groups 
operating in CEECs originate13. The variables we have used measure the degree of the 
bank’s capitalisation (equity to total asset), the degree of asset liquidity (liquid assets 
to total asset), profitability (profits to total asset) and the quality of credit portfolio 
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 See Papaioannou [2009] for an analysis of the impact of the institutional environment on 
international movements of bank financing.  
13
 Italy, Germany, Austria, France, Sweden, Greece, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. See 
Brana & Lahet [2010b] for an analysis of the presence of major European bank groups in CEECs.  
 (ratio of provisions for bad loans to total loans) (de Haas & Van Lelyveld [2006], 
Haselman [2006], Derviz & al. [2007]).  
Estimations have been made with stationary variables. The Wald test revealed 
heteroscedasticity of residuals which was corrected in the fixed effects model by the 
White estimator. To take account of the heteroscedasticity and cross-section of 
residuals (there is no serial correlation), we have also estimated a FGLS model 
(method developed by Parks & Kmenta) and a PCSE (OLS models with panel-
corrected standard errors, Beck & Katz method). Estimations are very close, perhaps a 
sign of the robustness of results.  
Our empirical results (Table 3) show firstly the importance of the parent bank’s 
financial situation, thereby confirming the results given by de Haas & Van Lelyveld 
[2006 & 2010]. Flawed solvency reduces the amount of bank loans made abroad. 
Multinational banks do therefore tend to transfer financial shocks suffered at home. 
By contrast, the financial situation of the host country’s banking system does not 
appear to be significant.  
 Table 3. Determinants of the net inflows of foreign bank loans (balance of payments 
data) (1996-2008)* 
 Fixed effects model FGLS model PCSE model 
 Coef. t-student Pr. Coef. t-student Pr. Coef. t-student Pr. 
Euro zone growth 328.97 1.20 0.234 130.67 0.50 0.620 323.48 0.72 0.471 
Host country 
growth 
49.46 2.13 0.035 26.47 1.71 0.088 46 1.84 0.066 
Provisions for 
parent bank bad 
loans (% total 
loans) 
-1697.2 -3.21 0.002 -1203.64 -3.40 0.001 -1809.1 -3.19 0.001 
Parent bank 
profits (% assets) 
-2469.42 -1.69 0.093 -1259.17 -1.66 0.096 -2553.7 -2.00 0.045 
% foreign banks 
in host country 
-19.93 -2.06 0.041 -13.48 -2.24 0.025 -20.43 -2.74 0.006 
EU integration 1534.64 2.55 0.012 1626.76 3.40 0.001 1427.16 2.11 0.035 
Constant 7229.63 2.82 0.006 5048.51 3.49 0.000 7702.69 3.38 0.001 
N° obs = 129 R-sq:  within  = 0.4632  R-sq = 0.4285 
 
* With the exception of the “euro zone growth” variable, only significant variables are given. 
 
Results then show that foreign banks are firmly into a “pull” strategy. It is the 
economic conditions of the host country, not of the home country, that determine the 
investment strategies of international banks. This would confirm the conclusion made 
by Haselmann [2006], according to which foreign banks prefer long-term strategies in 
CEECs. Integration into the EU has also been a potent factor of attraction, again 
pointing to long-term investment strategy. 
This result appears to be reinforced by the fact that no variable regarding appetite for 
risk, and no spread variable – measuring yield differentials between zones – appeared 
significant. Clearly, foreign bank financing  in no way responds to any form of short-
term financial logic, although this does not stop multinational banks from adopting 
arbitration strategies between zones (home country, other emerging countries), as 
shown by the negative sign with their profitability as a determinant for their foreign 
financing operations (however, this variable is only of very little significance).  
Lastly, as the PCA would suggest, the implantation of foreign banks is not associated 
with the increase in foreign bank financing, which would imply that foreign banks 
operating locally find local financing resources, probably via deposits.  
Our econometric analysis confirms, however, that the presence of foreign banks in 
CEECs does not protect these countries from the volatility of inflows of foreign bank 
loans (Table 4).  
 Table 4. Determinants of the volatility of inflows of foreign bank loans (balance of payments 
data), random effects model (2000-2008)14 
 
 Modèle à effets aléatoires Modèle FGLS Modèle PCSE 
 Coef. t-student Pr. Coef. t-student Pr. Coef. t-student Pr. 
% foreign banks 
in host country 
0.039 2.32 0.021 0.018 2.91 0.004 0.053 3.38 0.001 
Amount of 
foreign bank 
loans 
-0.0006 -2.29 0.022 -0.0003 -2.09 0.036 -0.0007 -4.61 0.000 
Variation of host 
country rating 
-1.083 -2.74 0.006 -0.805 -3.27 0.001 -1.247 -5.16 0.000 
Provisions for 
parent company 
bad loans (% 
total loans) 
0.835 2.09 0.037 0.849 3.38 0.001 0.822 2.38 0.017 
Constant -1.954 -1.24 0.216 -1.282 -1.47 0.141 -2.683 -1.68 0.094 
nb obs = 80 R-sq:  within  = 0.2351  R-sq:  0.3571 
 
The volatility of foreign bank loans to CEECs depends positively on the share of 
banking assets held by foreign banks in these countries. It falls in pace with the 
amount of these foreign loans, which is logical, and when the country’s rating 
improves. Lastly, as foreign bank loans are essentially the doing of European banks, 
any deterioration in the quality of their balance sheet (a rise in provisions for bad loans 
in percentage of total loans) increases the volatility of foreign financing.  
Thus, the presence of foreign banks operating in the host country clearly emerges as a 
factor of volatility with foreign bank loans. This result runs counter to the idea according 
to which foreign banks might have a stabilising effect on the host country. Foreign bank 
financing actually depends very much on the financial situation of the parent company.  
In a second step, we investigate the potential role of foreign banks on stability or 
volatility of domestic bank credit. Unlike the existing literature, we adopt a macro 
perspective and take into account the overall supply of credit and the foreign bank 
financing (thereby integrating relations parent companies / subsidiaries). 
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 The Breush-Pagan test [(χ2(1) = 62.35] reveals a degree of heteroscedasticity, probably due to the 
effects of size, that we have corrected using the White estimator. The Hausmann test indicates that the 
random effects model is preferable to the fixed effects model [(χ2(4) = 0.53]. The Lagrange de Breush-
Pagan multiplier test confirms that there are random specific effects [(χ2(1) = 18.08]. Lastly, the 
Wooldridge test does not indicate any presence of residual self-correlation [F(1.9) = 0.026]. 
 Table 5. Determinants of the volatility of domestic credit (2000-2008)15 
 
 Fixed effects model PCSE model 
 
Coef. t-student Pr. Coef. t-student Pr. 
% foreign banks in host 
country 
-.000489 -2.00 0.047 -.00044 -3.43 0.001 
Amount of foreign bank loans 3.00e-06 4.19 0.000 2.51e-06 2.71 0.007 
Domestic credit on GDP -4.65e-08 -3.25 0.002 -2.46e-08 -5.61 0.000 
Constant .1048 5.91 0.000 .1125 13.04 0.000 
N° obs = 134 R-sq:  within  = 0.1136 R-sq:  0.3451 
 
 Fixed effects model PCSE model 
 
Coef. t-student Pr. Coef. t-student Pr. 
% foreign banks in host 
country 
-.00034 -1.41 0.161 -.00020 -2.04 0.042 
Amount of foreign bank loans 2.75e-06 3.78 0.000 2.34e-06 2.57 0.010 
Domestic credit on GDP -3.07e-08 -2.17 0.032 -1.73e-08 -7.32 0.000 
Volatility of foreign bank loan 
(cross border) 
-.001218 -2.42 0.017 -.00195 -3.75 0.000 
Host country growth 0.04396 2.25 0.027 .08298 9.73 0.000 
Constante .08989 5.09 0.000 .08202 10.06 0.000 
N° obs = 129 R-sq:  within  = 0.1666 R-sq:  0.6106 
 
The presence of foreign banks reduces the volatility of domestic credit, which 
confirms the results of other studies (Haselman 2006; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 
2006, 2010). This stabilizing effect goes through two channels. The first is that the 
presence of foreign banks increases the supply of credit financed from local resources 
(domestic deposits) in local currency. These local assets in local currency are more 
stable than cross-border claims. The second channel is related to the access of foreign 
banks to international financing through their parent companies. While the amount of 
cross-border bank loans (variable amount of foreign bank loans) is positively 
correlated to the volatility of domestic credit, the volatility of these flows (variable 
volatility of foreign bank loans) is negatively related to that of domestic credit. We can 
see the sign of a buffering role of external financing from the local instability. This 
result confirms the existence of a "support effect" from the parent bank (see de Haas 
and van Lelyveld, 2010). The positive impact of the growth rate of the host country 
(host country growth variable) on the volatility of domestic credit confirms funding by 
                                                 
15
 The heteroskedasticity has been corrected in the fixed effects model using the White estimator. 
Wooldridge test indicates the existence of autocorrelation that we have corrected using a panel-
specific autocorrelation structure in the regression with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). We 
cannot use this AR1 autocorrelation structure with feasible generalized least squares because the 
estimate requires a panel cylinder. 
 capital inflows of the credit boom and growth. Finally, consistent with traditional 
literature, the credit volatility is inversely related to its amount, measured in terms of 
financial development (domestic credit to GDP ratio). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Contrary to commonly accepted opinion, the strong presence of foreign banks in 
CEECs is neither a factor for capital inflows nor a factor of stability for this financing. 
On the contrary, the local implantation of foreign banks could be a substitute for 
external/foreign bank loans (cross-border claims). In favouring local claims and loans 
in local currency, foreign banks operating locally help to promote the stability of 
domestic credit and the rise in the deposit over credit ratio, thereby rendering host 
countries less vulnerable to the risk of mass capital flow withdrawals.  
The presence of foreign banks is however associated with greater instability of foreign 
bank loans. We can see here the active management of the balance sheets of the 
foreign banks operating locally, which plays on loans from their parent companies to 
stabilise their credit supply. This result would appear to confirm the conclusions from 
other works, according to which the presence of foreign banks would make domestic 
credit less sensitive to local conditions. We might, however, also interpret this result 
in a less favourable light for the host country. The volatility of foreign bank financing 
may indeed also be explained by the financial situation of parent banks. In times of 
crisis, they adjust their foreign financing, thereby transferring financial instability to 
host countries. Over the entire study period, however, the stabilizing effect of the 
presence of foreign banks dominate. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Table 1. The characteristics of banking systems in CEECs (2007) 
 Number of 
banks 
Number of banks 
under foreign 
control 
Share of foreign banks 
(% of assets in the 
banking system) 
Share of European banks 
(% of assets in the 
banking system) 
Bulgaria 29 21 79,5 81,6 
Czech Republic 56 34 91,5 96,1 
Estonia 15 13 98,8 98,8 
Latvia 31 13 55,4 62,5 
Lithuania 80 8 83,7 83,7 
Hungary 206 30 54,3 57,4 
Poland 718 54 62,1 70,5 
Romania 42 35 82,1 82,1 
Slovenia 27 11 28,5 28,5 
Slovakia 26 25 95,9 95,9 
European Union 13* 6128 1111 17,4 19 
European Union 27 8348 1711 20,5 23,8 
 
* Countries from euro-zone in 2007. 
Source : Authors calculation with ECB data (2008).  
 
Table 2. Foreign claims (%GDP) (December) 
 
2007 2009 
Bulgaria 87,9 91,8 
Czech Republic 99,3 92,9 
Estonia 174,7 146,6 
Latvia 416,5 118,3 
Lithuania 100,5 90,6 
Hungary 98,2 112,9 
Poland 57,4 69,6 
Roumania 72,6 71,4 
Slovenia 80,3 78,8 
Slovakia 107,8 84,7 
Source : BIS and Datastream, Authors calculation.  
 
